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Abstract
The extant research on policy transfer insufficiently addresses two issues. First, transfer 
to less-advanced countries. Second, micro-institutional pressures on subsidiaries, 
particularly the role of local partners in joint ventures (JVs). This study investigates the 
transfer of labour market orientations by American multinational enterprises to their 
Turkish subsidiaries by focusing on the influences of macro- and micro-institutional 
factors when the ‘transferor’ is an advanced and ‘transferee’ is a less-advanced economy, 
‘dominance effects’, and the role of local JV partners. Case study findings provide evidence 
for ‘smooth’ transfer of the policy. This uncommon finding is discussed as a result of 
‘ideal combination’ of ‘encouraging pressures’ at the macro- and micro-institutional 
levels, including role of local JV partners and the nature of the policy transferred. 
Keywords
international human resource management, joint ventures, labour market orientations, 
less-advanced countries, policy transfer 
Introduction
A key theme in the international human resource management (IHRM) concerns the 
‘global – local question’ (Edwards and Kuruvilla, 2005): how do multinational enter-
prises (MNEs) control international operations through globally-integrated and standard-
ized human resource (HR) policies, while also responding to the ‘local isomorphic’ 
pressures to become similar to the firms in the host-country (Ferner and Quintanilla, 
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1998)? This line of research has recently seen a considerable growth, considering the 
macro-institutional influences with a comparative institutionalist (e.g. Edwards and 
Ferner, 2002), micro-institutional influences with new institutionalist (e.g. Kostova and 
Roth, 2002), or more rarely, both sets of influences with a combined institutionalist per-
spective (e.g. Ferner et al., 2005a; Tempel et al., 2006). 
This article focuses on three issues inadequately addressed in the extant literature: 
first, despite repeated calls for an extension of the range of countries and business sys-
tems studied, research still focuses mainly on the operations of MNEs from and in 
advanced economies. Might there be any theoretically important issues not articulated in 
the literature when the transfer is intended from an advanced economy to a less-advanced 
(e.g. emerging) one, especially considering potential ‘dominance effects’ (Smith and 
Meiksins, 1995)? A second important point is about ‘institutional duality’, defined as 
pressures on the subsidiaries for internal and external legitimacy emanating from their 
MNE parent and host-country institutional environments, respectively (Kostova, 1999; 
Kostova and Roth, 2002; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). While institutional duality is con-
sidered as an important influence on the policy transfer, only the ‘foreign’ MNEs’ poten-
tial pressure is formulated as an organizational-level influence, neglecting that of ‘local’ 
(host-country) parent(s) in the case of joint ventures (JVs). In fact, JVs present an exten-
sive entry mode particularly to less-advanced economies (e.g. China). Local JV partners 
potentially have a significant governance role in the subsidiaries while the latter depend 
on them for obtaining a range of resources (e.g. expertise, managerial, and administrative 
skills). A second question is therefore about the likely dual pressure subsidiaries face at 
the organizational level originating from both their parents, i.e. ‘foreign’ and ‘local’, 
when the governance structure is a JV. Moreover, while the pressures from the local JV 
partner are internal to the firm and micro-level, their relationship to broader host pres-
sures for isomorphism is not all that clear. Are JV partners merely additional ‘transmis-
sion belts’ for host pressures, or do they add a separate, distinctive dimension to local 
isomorphic pressures? Lastly, more emphasis is needed on the nature of the specific 
policy considered for transfer. Some policies can be more prone to resistance from sub-
sidiaries, resulting in avoidance of, and non-compliance with, corporate pressures for the 
transfer (see Tempel et al. [2006] on collective representation and Ferner et al. [2005a] 
on diversity policies). Consequently, might others be more ‘suitable’ for transfer, despite 
significant differences between host- and home-country institutional environments? 
This article addresses these issues by using case study evidence of labour market 
orientations (LMO) in American MNEs in Turkey. For the purposes of this study, LMO 
are defined as the preferred recourse by the organization to internal or external labour 
markets when recruiting for open positions. LMO constitute a significant aspect of cor-
porate policy as they have the capacity to shape related HR policies, i.e. selection, train-
ing and development, and compensation. More specifically, the research questions are: 
how do the micro- and macro-institutional pressures for isomorphism influence policy 
transfer by US MNEs from an advanced, dominant economy to a less-advanced host-
country, i.e. Turkey? Within this context, do host JV parents, as governance actors, exert 
any notable influences? Does the specific policy investigated, i.e. LMO, make any dif-
ference on the acceptance/refusal of the transfer?
The article is organized as follows: the next section develops a framework for explor-
ing the influences of home- and host-country institutional systems on MNEs’ LMO, 
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paying particular attention to the issues of ‘dominance’ and ‘institutional duality’. In the 
following section the most relevant features of the Turkish business system (TBS) are 
delineated comparatively with those of the USA, and the institutional distance in terms of 
the LMO between the two systems is discussed. The method section is followed by the 
presentation of case study evidence on LMO. The discussion draws out the implications of 
the findings, in particular for an understanding of policy transfer from advanced economies 
to less-advanced ones, role of JV partners, and the nature of the policy transferred. 
Macro- and micro-level influences on policy transfer
Studies using the comparative institutionalism focus on the influences of home- and 
host-country national business systems (NBS) on the transfer and adaptation of HRM 
policies and practices (e.g. Almond et al., 2006; Edwards et al., 2007; Ferner et al., 
2001, 2004). They contend that MNEs are ‘“embedded” in their own NBS that com-
prise interlocking structures and institutions that fundamentally shape the nature of 
markets, competition, and business activity in general’ (Ferner and Tempel, 2006: 12). 
This framework argues that MNEs develop their HRM policies in response to key 
home-country national institutions. It stresses the significance of two major factors that 
shape firm behaviour. First, the ‘interaction effects’, i.e. the dominant and mutually 
supportive national institutions developed as a result of historical paths that favour 
certain kinds of market arrangements. Second, ‘institutional complementarities’, which 
emphasize the connection between market organization and market-hierarchy relations 
(Deeg and Jackson, 2007). 
New institutionalism is concerned with how institutional effects are diffused within 
‘organizational fields’, i.e. ‘the set of organizations that in the aggregate, constitute a 
recognized area of institutional life’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 143). It argues that 
organizations tend to adopt similar practices and perspectives to be ‘isomorphic’ with 
others in the same field. The driving force behind conformity to institutional pressures is 
efforts to gain legitimacy, defined by Suchman (1995: 574) as:
. . . a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.
New institutionalist studies mostly deal with the transfer of practice from the parent 
company to subsidiaries at the organizational level, where subsidiaries face ‘institutional 
duality’ (Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). To gain 
legitimacy, subsidiaries must successfully deal with two sets of isomorphic pressures: 
first, from the host country’s distinct institutional environment with its own institutional 
and relational contexts; and second, from the parent company that mandates the subsidi-
ary to adopt the former’s corporate practices (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Kostova and 
Roth (2002: 217) propose that the first set of isomorphic pressures, i.e. the effects of the 
host institutional context, can be systematically examined by using an ‘institutional pro-
file’, defined as ‘the issue-specific set of regulatory, cognitive, and normative institutions 
in a given country’. Institutional distance, i.e. the difference or similarity between the 
institutional profiles of the home and host countries, is argued to mediate the challenges 
imposed by institutional duality (Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002). Kostova 
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(1999) argues that when the institutional distance is greater there will be a higher need to 
adopt organizational practices to achieve external legitimacy, while it will also be more 
difficult to understand the host environment and its legitimacy requirements. By the 
same token, ‘favourable’ institutional environments, where the institutional profile influ-
ences the adoption positively, will encourage the adoption (Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
A second set of isomorphic pressures exists at the organizational level coming from 
the parent company, which is defined by dependence, trust, and identity relations between 
the parent and subsidiary (Kostova and Roth, 2002). If the subsidiary needs to rely on the 
parent company for major resources such as technology, capital, and expertise, this 
dependence will positively influence implementation of an organizational practice 
dictated. 
While earlier studies claim that subsidiaries are submissive actors in responding to 
parent company pressure to adopt home-country practices (e.g. Rosenzweig and Singh, 
1991), more recently different forms of subsidiary responses are identified. Using 
Oliver’s (1991) framework, they vary from minimal to active adoption (Kostova and 
Roth, 2002), from resistance to accommodation (Ferner et al., 2005a), and include the 
range of proactive responses, from compromising with to strategically complying with 
(Tempel et al., 2006: 1564). Tempel et al. (2006) conclude that while institutional dis-
tance can give a broad idea about the (dis)similarities between home- and host-country 
institutions, it is not possible to understand subsidiary practices without considering the 
dependencies that host-country institutions can create, or subsidiary managers can use, 
against the parent company.
Although the contributions of these studies to understanding the various aspects of 
policy transfer in MNEs are highly acknowledged, this article focuses on three aspects 
that the extant research has largely neglected. First, the literature almost entirely focuses 
on the transfer of policies in the ‘Triad’, i.e. the EU, the USA, and Japan, which exem-
plify the advanced economies. There is a definite need to understand how macro- and 
micro-institutional influences work when the transfer is intended from an advanced 
economy to a less-advanced one, particularly where power relations between countries 
are important (Elger and Smith, 2006; Kostova, 1999; Smith and Meiksins, 1995). Smith 
and Meiksins (1995) argue that ‘dominance effects’, i.e. the transfer of ‘best practices’ by 
the ‘dominant’ economies/societies, should be amalgamated with the interaction of soci-
ety (institutional and cultural) and systems effects. The extent and direction of transfer 
depend on a number of conditions, including the relative positions of the ‘transferor’ and 
‘transferee’ in the global economic system, and the nature of the solution the transferred 
practice provides for problems at the receiving end (Smith and Meiksins, 1995: 261–
263). The relational ties between the sender and receiver countries are among the key 
factors that define the process and outcome of the transfer (Üsdiken, 2004). The relative 
dependence of one country on another economically and/or politically might be instru-
mental in facilitating the transfer (e.g. Arias and Guillén, 1998). Moreover, the historical 
economic and developmental backwardness of the receiver country can create a tradi-
tional openness to transfer and emulation of knowledge and practices (cf. Üsdiken, 
2004), resulting in a national enthusiasm for importing from abroad, i.e. ‘active import-
ing’ (Bjarnar and Kipping, 1998). The smooth transfer from a ‘dominant’ advanced econ-
omy to an ‘active importer’, less-advanced one can therefore result in an adopted policy, 
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rather than adaption or translation (Kipping et al., 2008). While the power and domi-
nance issues are conceptualized theoretically, they have not been investigated for the 
transfer of HR policies by MNEs from advanced economies to subsidiaries in less-
advanced ones. 
Secondly, influences of different constituents and the organization’s dependence on 
them are important as an organization’s response to institutional pressures is shaped by 
the multiplicity of demands (Oliver, 1991). A significant constituent insufficiently 
researched is local JV partners that can have a direct effect on subsidiary policies through 
the joint governance structures. Isomorphism pressures at the organizational level are 
assumed to be related to the parent-company, i.e. the MNE (Kostova, 1999; Kostova and 
Roth, 2002; Taylor et al., 1996). In fact, such pressures may emanate from several 
organizational actors in the local environment, including most directly from local JV 
partners, as there are usually governance as well as dependence, identity, and trust 
issues. JVs constitute a significant governance structure in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) although a limited number of studies have so far investigated the implications of 
shared ownership on the transfer of home-country policies and host-country applications 
adopted (e.g. Guest and Hoque, 1996; Lu and Bjorkman, 1997; Martinez and Ricks, 
1989; Shenkar and Zeira, 1987; see also Hartmann et al., 2010 for a recent but rare exam-
ple). Martinez and Ricks (1989) find that the parent on whom the subsidiary is more 
resource-dependent is more influential on the HR decisions of US companies in Mexico. 
While the ability of the local partner to use its expertise and knowledge to access raw 
materials and local markets is a source of influence, control of product and process tech-
nologies are found to be the main source of power in decision-making (Shenkar and 
Zeira, 1987).
Moreover, the nature of pressures from the local JV partners can be specified in rela-
tion to those from the host NBS. While the former are more clearly micro-level and 
internal to the firm, their relationship to broader host-country pressures for isomorphism 
are not easily apparent. Local JV partners are ‘embedded’ in the host-country NBS and 
their policies are developed in response to the same business environment as where the 
subsidiary operates. Whether they are only additional ‘transmission belts’ for host pres-
sures or add a distinctive dimension to local isomorphic pressures is a theoretically sig-
nificant issue.
Lastly, the role of the specific policy/practice intended for transfer needs to be more 
clearly identified. Extant literature generally focuses on problems in the transfer of HRM 
policies, e.g. resistance by local subsidiary, resulting in hybridization or various avoid-
ance strategies (e.g. Almond and Ferner, 2006; Gooderham et al., 1998; Schmitt and 
Sadowski, 2003; Tempel et al., 2006). While pay and performance (e.g. Almond et al., 
2006; Björkman and Furu, 2000; Bloom et al., 2003) and collective representation (e.g. 
Beaumont and Townley, 1985; Ferner et al., 2005b; Tempel et al., 2006) are among the 
most covered, employment systems (e.g. Colling and Clark, 2002) or diversity manage-
ment (Ferner et al., 2005a), as well as the role of the nature of these policies/practices on 
the transfer, are acknowledged less. 
The framework used to investigate the above-mentioned issues therefore incorporates 
the governance structure and role of local JV partners to the macro-influences of NBS 
and micro-influences of MNEs. To understand how transfer occurs between advanced 
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and less-advanced economies within this framework, host- and home-countries are 
selected accordingly. The article focuses specifically on LMO to explore the role of the 
policy transferred.
National business systems and institutional distance
Institutional systems: Turkey and the US
Berkman and Özen (2007) suggest that the TBS has evolved from a state-dependent to a 
state-coordinated system. Among its two major characteristics are: first, the strong state 
that still actively coordinates and controls economic activities; and second, the big busi-
ness groups, i.e. ‘holdings’, created by the former (Gökşen and Üsdiken, 2001). The 
Turkish private sector started to gain a larger share in the economy only in the 1950s 
(Buğra, 1994) and continued to grow into the 1970s within the protected environment of 
the state-planned, inward-looking, ‘import-substitution’ economy (Kepenek and Yentürk, 
2000). Incentives and other measures in the import-substitution strategy, tax, and finan-
cial advantages helped establish family-controlled big ‘holdings’ in the 1960s, which 
exemplify the nature of the corporation in Turkey (Çolpan, 2010). The Turkish holding 
structure, with its diversified nature, and role of the state in its establishment and devel-
opment, is comparable to similar structures in lately industrialized countries, for exam-
ple, the Korean chaebol (Buğra and Üsdiken, 1995). Turkish holdings have a significant 
role in the Turkish economy, owning the majority of the largest industrial companies 
dominance effects
MNE HRM policies & practices local JV partner HRM policies 
Transfer of corporate policies & practices
‘embeddedness’
‘embeddedness’
Macro-institutional pressures
Micro-institutional pressures Micro-institutional pressures
Home-country institutional system
(advanced economy)
Host-country institutional system
(less-advanced economy)
Figure 1 Research framework
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(Berkman and Özen, 2007) and they also make it in international rankings (e.g. World’s 
Largest 500 Companies by Forbes in 2006). Çolpan (2010) claims that the ‘holding’ 
strictly controls its affiliate firms in three main areas: investment decisions, financial 
coordination, and HRM policies – especially LMO and reward management.
The USA became Turkey’s key economic, political, and military ally during the 1950s, 
around the same period when the USA started to penetrate foreign markets. Turkey was 
given its share from the Marshall Plan and Mutual Security Act arrangements, in addition 
to American support for know-how and education to restructure and reform its state and 
industry (cf. Üsdiken, 2004). Üsdiken (2004: 258) argues that the established tradition of 
emulating the West (i.e. Europe) as the major source of learning and assistance since the 
late 18th century was now orientated towards the USA. Although the global dominance 
of the USA could be questioned presently, owing to the major financial crises it has been 
experiencing since 2008, its significant ‘dominance effects’ on Turkey in political, eco-
nomic, and military arenas continue. Turkey is a less-advanced receiver country, with a 
strong tradition of transferring knowledge and practices from abroad, and whose rela-
tional ties with the ‘dominant’ sender country depict multilateral dependence (Üsdiken, 
2004). Üsdiken and Wasti (2002) define Turkey as a ‘receptive’ country of (in particular 
Personnel and HR) management ideas originating from the USA. Erçek (2006) adds that 
HRM labels and ideas in Turkey are applied quickly owing to an instituted habit of emu-
lating and successful adoption of Western practices.
Among the major differences between the key features of the home- and host-institutional 
systems, the most significant ones for the purposes of this article prevail in the education 
and financial areas. In Turkey, despite recent ‘impressive’ improvements (OECD, 2007), 
educational attainment and access to education at every level remain still significantly 
behind most OECD and EU countries. In the PISA (Programme for International Student 
Assessments by OECD) rankings, Turkey scores among the last five countries in every 
indicator.1 Quality of education continues to be very low, primarily as a result of signifi-
cant disparities among schools, a shortage of teachers, and low socio-economic status of 
students. Consequently, there is a large but uneducated and unskilled workforce, while 
an educated and qualified workforce is still scarce. While the highly stratified American 
educational system is claimed to neglect mass education and provide an outstanding but 
‘elite’ university education, it nevertheless produces potential employees with enough 
basic skills and education to accommodate the less-skilled labour needs of mass manu-
facturing sectors (Ferner, 2000). Although there is certainly a need for company-level 
training of blue-collar workers in both countries, the level of knowledge and skills avail-
able is much lower in Turkey than in the USA, as only 50 percent of the total population 
make it to the secondary education level (OECD, 2007). 
The financial systems are completely opposite: credit-based in Turkey, where weak 
stock markets are underdeveloped (Tanyeri, 2010); equity-based in the US, where the 
main management ideology has become boosting ‘shareholder value’ in the short term, 
as a result of the intensifying ‘shareholder capitalism’ and accelerated international com-
petition (O’Sullivan, 2000). Firms in Turkey do not experience a comparable pressure 
for demonstrating short-term achievements, as the publicly traded shares do not consti-
tute a critical amount (Balaban and Kunter, 1997). Moreover, the leading holdings have 
their own banks, which extend credit lines for their affiliates (Alper and Öniş, 2003), 
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although this has recently changed with the increased share of foreign capital through 
acquisitions and mergers (Bakır and Öniş, 2010).
Labour market orientations
A comparison of the LMO in the two countries helps to understand the institutional dis-
tance. Supply and demand for labour meet in extremely flexible external labour markets 
(ELMs) in the strongly ‘market-oriented’ American business system (Dore, 1989). High 
labour turnover rates and career mobility between firms are seen as natural. It is argued 
that standardized mass production helped create ELMs, while the short-termism of 
financial markets further encouraged ‘numerical flexibility’, i.e. labour perceived as a 
cost to be minimized where downsizing is considered the first way to achieve it during 
difficult times (Clark and Almond, 2006). There are few institutional or cultural con-
straints on ELMs and except for government regulation on discrimination (Myors et al., 
2008), ‘employment at will’ is legal and commonly accepted. There are no regulatory 
pressures on employers to demonstrate that dismissals are fair. Indeed, Kochan et al. 
(1994: xiii) argue that the US labour market has long been ‘a place where anything goes’. 
Alongside the largely prevailing ELMs among US firms, there has also been a long 
tradition of developing firms’ own, particularly managerial, employees within strong 
internal labour markets (ILMs). ILMs are characterized as closed systems where: i) 
access to job ladders is open only at a few entry-levels and opportunities for climbing the 
ladder are saved for ‘incumbents’; ii) training and development is offered by companies; 
and, iii) long-term employment and career opportunities are provided within the same 
firm. Osterman (1988) argues that the ILMs were originally developed as an organiza-
tional solution to a combination of external problems, i.e. unionization threats, labour 
scarcity, and government regulation. Between the 1950s and 1980s, ILM systems were 
widely applied in the more strongly unionized sectors of the American economy and, 
from the 1960s, in a growing number of ‘high road’ non-union firms (Katz and Darbishire, 
2000; Kochan et al., 1994). A more philosophical variant of the high-road approach was 
found in ‘welfare capitalism’, applied by some major American companies, including 
Eastman Kodak, Polaroid, DuPont, and IBM (Jacoby, 1997). 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, however, ILMs have been under pressure in the 
USA for four main reasons: i) the effects of the shift from manufacturing to service 
industries, hence changes in the number and mixture of people employed in these sectors 
and skills requirements; ii) increased competition within tougher domestic and interna-
tional markets, which has raised serious cost considerations; iii) improvements in tech-
nology that have changed not only production systems but also management and control 
practices (Osterman, 1999); and iv) pressures from ‘shareholder capitalism’ (O’Sullivan, 
2000). Survey results provide evidence for the ‘deterioration’ of the American labour 
market in norms, career patterns (e.g. declining job tenures, increased job turnover, 
increased dislocation), wage determination, shifts in the external context that governs the 
labour market, and changes in the structure of the economy itself (Osterman, 1999). 
These findings are interpreted as indicators for weakening ILMs, and have been held 
responsible for the ‘death’ of internal managerial careers (Capelli, 1999), resulting in the 
increased use of ELM systems2 (Capelli, 1995; Osterman, 1999). While Capelli (1999) 
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and Osterman (1999) tend to explain the changes in the LMO of American firms through 
external pressures, Grimshaw et al. (2001) argue that any transformation of ILMs as an 
internal organizational logic would be more likely to be forced by a combination of both 
external and internal factors. Butler et al. (2006) consequently claim that variations in 
employment system policies can be expected in different organizations, depending on 
how they choose to handle inherent tensions. For instance, the core-periphery model 
emerged as an ‘innovative’ method in response to macroeconomic uncertainty and flex-
ibility arguments (Jackson et al., 1989). 
The institutional distance between LMO in Turkey and the USA is not very significant 
at the regulatory level, while there are some differences at the cognitive and normative 
levels. Similar to the USA, Turkish companies have not been legally restricted in their 
staffing practices. The labour code of 20033 brings restricting rules for ‘fair’ dismissal, 
equal employment opportunities, downsizing, and complete shutdowns. However, nei-
ther the letter nor the enforcement of the law is strong (Ararat and Bayazıt, 2009). 
Suppressive laws make it difficult for workers to gain any power through unionization. 
Therefore, it is argued that Turkey’s employment system is comparable to that of the 
USA in terms of legal flexibility granted to employers, where ‘dismissals at will’ have 
been widely applied by small and medium size firms, and seasonal/temporary employ-
ment has been traditional in cyclical industries. In the USA there is a stronger regulatory 
framework for certain employment issues, i.e. equal employment opportunities and dis-
crimination, where laws and their enforcement are much stricter than those in other 
countries, including Turkey4 (Myors et al., 2008). Another significant difference between 
the two countries concerns the existence of a strong normative environment in the US, 
through the media (e.g. ‘best companies to work for’) and grass-roots societal pressure 
(e.g. campaigns against sweatshops).5 Such a normative context does not yet exist in 
Turkey: even pervasive collective actions do not get much (if any) attention from the 
media or the society at large.
Nevertheless provision of job security and long-term employment opportunities are 
traditionally observed in the large corporate sector in Turkey (Nichols and Sugur, 2004). 
This is in line with expectations of employees, who rank job security as the most impor-
tant issue in employment relations (Yıldırım, 1999). Large firms are found to prefer 
promotion from within, generally based on seniority (Uyargil et al., 2001). State-owned 
enterprises and government institutions, which have been among Turkey’s largest 
employers, traditionally offer life-long employment. In return, employers expect loyalty 
from their employees (Sargut, 2001) and job-hopping is not perceived positively. Careers 
are usually made in the same company or holding, where cross-promotions between 
affiliates are widely applied. 
Some parallels can be drawn between prevailing employment patterns in large Turkish 
employers and ILMs by American welfare capitalists. They both adopt ILMs in response 
to certain institutional factors: legally permissive environments, labour scarcity and, 
though to a limited degree in Turkey, threats of unionization. While welfare capitalists 
are opposed to unions on a philosophical basis – unions are perceived as a threat to mana-
gerial prerogative – in Turkey the opposition is more on economic and social grounds: 
unions are regarded as creators of unrest and economic loss in the workplace (Koç, 
2006). ILMs are aligned with the paternalistic leadership styles of Turkish owners (and 
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top-level managers) and the expectations of employees for protective and concerned 
‘bosses’ more like a father figure (Sargut and Özen, 2001). As a result of a credit-based 
financial system and network relations (e.g. holding companies’ own banks), the pres-
sure for increasing ‘shareholder value’ is not as strong as in the USA. The cost of labour 
is significantly lower in Turkey than in developed economies, particularly considering 
moderate to high productivity levels (OECD, 2007). It is therefore easier to implement 
ILMs within this context of a less-advanced country.
Method
To investigate the research questions, case study method was used. Although quantitative 
studies provide broad pictures of comparative HRM policies and practices, contextual 
embeddedness of in-depth case studies allows a deep understanding of events, institu-
tions, and processes, and their interaction within the particular context (Snow and 
Anderson, 1991). 
Multiple cases were developed to increase the possibility of replication of findings, 
thus improving the generalizability of the case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). Case 
companies were selected from among American companies operating in Turkey by using 
analytically significant criteria, i.e. ‘criterion-based’ sampling (LeCompte and Preissle, 
1993: 63), to ensure analytical generalizations. Accordingly, cases from a number of sec-
tors were chosen to consider micro-institutional pressures by parent companies to adopt 
corporate operations and manufacturing systems, and the latter’s influences on LMO. 
To identify leading American companies in Turkey, in addition to size and age, the 
significance of the subsidiary for Turkey (in terms of employment, amount of exports, de- 
regulation), and the share of total and American FDI in the particular sector were used. 
At the time of the fieldwork, the largest share of American investment in Turkey (72%) 
was in manufacturing, which was concentrated in food and drink, textiles, chemicals, 
and automobile production. Although services had a small share, two service companies 
that received considerable FDI after 2001 were included.6 To investigate the influences 
of corporate governance structures and local JV parents, subsidiaries where leading 
Turkish holdings are JV partners were identified. Consequently, seven American MNEs 
from different sectors were studied (Table 1).
Case studies were developed using data collected mainly by semi-structured inter-
views at subsidiary and regional headquarters and 79 interviews were conducted with a 
variety of actors (Table 2). The majority of the interviewees were from the HR depart-
ments: at the subsidiary level, HR Directors/Managers, Heads of sub-areas (e.g. Training 
and Development, Compensation, Recruitment and Selection), team leaders, specialists, 
as well as previous HR directors (in the cases where the historical information was sig-
nificant). In the JV cases, HR Coordinators of the Turkish Holdings were also inter-
viewed. At the regional headquarters of the US parents, top-level HR managers (e.g. Vice 
Presidents - VP) responsible from a (sub-) region (e.g. Europe, Middle East, or south 
Europe), or an HR function provided information from the corporate perspective. At the 
subsidiaries, other top-level managers (e.g. General Managers, Assistant General 
Managers, and Directors of major functional areas) were also interviewed where possi-
ble and relevant. While most of the interviewees at the subsidiary and the regional 
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headquarters were local, a total of 11 expatriates at both levels were also included among 
the interviewees. The last group of interviewees comprised union and employers’ asso-
ciation officials (Table 3). Through information from, and perspectives of, various par-
ties it was possible to benefit from the ‘multi-perspectival’ nature of case study research 
(Snow and Anderson, 1991: 154) and to triangulate data collected (Maxwell, 1996). 
The number of interviews conducted in each of the case companies ranged between 
seven and 19. The variance was owing to company features and the level of access gained 
in each company. In the manufacturing cases, there were more managers to be inter-
viewed in the plants. In the unionized and de-unionized (and two non-unionized cases, 
i.e. FMCG2 and HotelCO, where there had been unionization attempts) the number of 
interviews increased with the inclusion of union officials. In the JV cases, Holding HR 
coordinators were interviewed. The level of access gained in each company also varied, 
e.g. in FMCG2, despite several attempts, access was denied at the corporate 
headquarters. 
Interviews were planned at the US headquarters to capture the corporate perspectives 
on international HR policy and to triangulate data. However, access proved impossible 
Table 1 Case study companies
Company Line of activity Ownership 
structure
Mode of 
entry
Industrial 
relations
No. of 
employees 
(Turkey)
No. of 
employees 
(Global)
AutoCO1 Commercial 
vehicles and cars; 
manufacturing  
and sales
JV (equal US* 
and TR*)
Brownfield Unionized 8000 201,000
FMCG1 FMCG 
(packaged food); 
manufacturing  
and sales
WOS Brownfield De-unionized 510 48,000
FMCG2 FMCG (tobacco 
products); 
manufacturing  
and sales
JV (majority 
US*)
Greenfield Non-unionized 1600 75,600
PharmaCO1 Pharmaceuticals 
(hospital care); 
manufacturing  
and sales
JV (equal US* 
and TR*)
Brownfield De-unionized 554 48,500
TexCO Clothing/  
garment; 
manufacturing  
and sales
JV (majority 
US*)
Greenfield Unionized 660 10,000
FinCO Retail and 
corporate  
banking
WOS Greenfield Non-unionized 2249 350,000
HotelCO Hotel WOS Greenfield Non-unionized 260 80,000
JV: Joint venture; WOS: Wholly-owned subsidiary; *US: American partner, *TR: Turkish partner
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Table 2 Distribution of interviews
Interview with HR management 
(subsidiaries)
HR management 
(regional  
headquarters)
Other functional  
managers (subsidiaries  
and regional headquarters)
Unions Total
AutoCO1  6  4  6  3 19
FMCG1  5  1  3  1 10
FMCG2  7  2  1 10
PharmaCO1  4  1  2  2  9
TexCO  5  3  6  3 17
HotelCO  2  3  1  1  7
FinCO  3  2  2 n/a  7
TOTAL 32 14 22 11 79
Table 3 Distribution of interviews across the respondents 
Interview at Interview with
AutoCO1: TURKEY HR/IR Director (2); HR Specialist; HR Training Team Leader; 
Holding1 HR Coordinator and Assistant Coordinator; 
Chief Finance Officer (expatriate); Vice General Manager 
(expatriate); Assistant General Manager (Sales and Marketing; 
expatriate); Assistant General Manager (Sales and Marketing); 
Union officials (2); Employers’ Association President
EUROPE USAuto1 Europe HR Managers (2); Organisational Personnel 
Planning Managers (2)
FMCG1: TURKEY 
EUROPE
HR Director (3); Plant HR Manager; Previous HR Director; 
Production Manager; Previous General Manager (expatriate); 
General Manager; previous union’s president
USFood Organisation and Capability Development Director 
(expatriate)
FMCG2: TURKEY HR Directors (2; one expatriate); HR Manager (2); Plant HR 
Manager; Holding2 HR Coordinator; Previous HR Director; 
Plant Production Manager; Sales and Distribution Director; 
union official
PharmaCO1: TURKEY  
REGIONAL
HR Director; HR Manager; Plant Manager (expatriate), 
Holding3 HR Coordinator and previous Coordinator; previous 
union’s officials (2); Employers’ Association General Secretary
USPharma1 HR Manager
TexCO: TURKEY  
EUROPE and Regional
HR Manager (2); previous HR Manager; General Manager (3); 
Finance Director; Sales Director; Union officials (3)
USTex IR Director Supply Chain (2; one expatriate); Divisional 
HR Director
HotelCO: TURKEY 
EUROPE
HR Director (2); General Manager (expatriate); union officials
USHotel HR Director; HR Manager; Sub-regional HR Director
FinCO: TURKEY 
EUROPE
Country HR Officer; VP HR Staffing and Communications; HR 
Manager Training and Development; Chief of Staff
USFin Regional VP HR (2; one expatriate); Senior Manager 
(EMEA; expatriate)
 at Bilkent University on November 26, 2012hum.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Sayım 585
as no direct reporting and communication lines were established between the Turkish 
subsidiary and the American headquarters. In most companies, regional headquarters 
were in Europe and interviews with top-level HR directors were conducted face-to-face 
by the author. In two cases, where the Turkish subsidiaries reported to non-European 
regional headquarters, telephone interviews were held owing to financial and time 
constraints.
The interviews took place during spring and summer (March–August) in 2002, 2003 
and 2004, mainly owing to the location of the case companies and work arrangements of 
the author. Arranging and conducting interviews at subsidiary (all in Istanbul) and 
regional headquarters in various European cities required unrestricted free time, hence 
the three intervals. Snow and Anderson (1991) argue that the case study conducted over 
time provides a major advantage as:
It facilitates the possibility of capturing and analysing events and happenings, interactions and 
relationships, and groups and institutions as they emerge and evolve across time. (p. 161)
Interviews on average lasted two hours. Except when respondents declined their con-
sent (four managers and 11 union officers), 64 out of 79 interviews were taped and tran-
scribed verbatim. Extensive notes were taken during the interviews that were not taped. 
Transcriptions and notes were coded and analysed by the author using specialized soft-
ware QSR6.
Findings
Labour market orientations of the wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS) (i.e. FMCG1, 
FinCO, and HotelCO) are uniformly reported as an ILM approach (Table 4). The inter-
viewees in the Turkish subsidiaries start by describing their internal job postings and 
promotion from within policies in reply to questions about recruitment and selection 
policies. Evidently complementary HR policies for an ILM approach also exist: job lad-
ders open mostly at the entry levels only and higher level positions reserved for ‘incum-
bents’; formal and standardized job grading and job definitions; performance-related 
and competitive compensation; early identification and promotion of high potentials; 
high investment into internal training and development programmes; succession plan-
ning. The existence of an ILM approach and related policies in these cases are con-
firmed by the interviewees at the European headquarters and as a US corporate policy 
transferred to Turkey.
The JV subsidiaries (i.e. AutoCO1, PharmaCO1, FMCG2, TexCO) also report an 
ILM orientation, with almost identical HR policies and complementary practices. The 
only distinction is about whose corporate policy is transferred to the subsidiary: in 
AutoCO1 and PharmaCO1, ILM policies of Holding1 and Holding3 respectively are 
reported to have been transferred, while in FMCG2 and TexCO, they are reported as 
USFMCG2 and USTex corporate policies. AutoCO1 and PharmaCO1 rely completely 
on their Turkish parents for HRM systems, policies, and applications. In AutoCO1, vari-
ous interviewees, including expatriates and those at the USAuto1’s European HQ, con-
firm that Holding1’s HRM policies and practices, including LMO and related policies, 
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are transferred and applied. Similarly in PharmaCO1, HRM policies and practices devel-
oped, coordinated, and controlled by Holding3 are transferred. Contrary to these two 
JVs, in FMCG2 and TexCO, Turkish parents have minority shares and no managerial 
involvement, including HRM. 
There are clear operational requirements that point towards use of an ILM in the case 
companies, regardless of the governance structure and sector (Table 5). All manufactur-
ing cases (AutoCO1, FMCG1, FMCG2, PharmaCO1) except TexCO depend on their 
American parents for the highly complex and state-of-the-art production/operations sys-
tems transferred from the USA. To operate these systems and use teamwork structures 
successfully, while also complying with strict and high quality requirements and per-
forming well in annual audits, case companies need to secure a multi-skilled and quali-
fied workforce at both operational and managerial levels.
Cases from the services have similar conditions. Large multinational banks operate 
their complex and knowledge-based business using high technology. In FinCO these 
systems are transferred from its US parent, USFin, and FinCO is highly dependent on 
USFin for its operations. USFin compels its subsidiary to provide highest quality service 
and comply with the strict international and American regulations in the financial sector, 
intensified particularly after the infamous fraud cases of, for example, Enron and 
WorldCom. Thus the pressure for an ILM in FinCO comes partly from the nature of the 
international and local regulatory environments. The company must ensure that the 
behaviour of subsidiary personnel should avoid compromising the firm as a whole. 
Therefore firm-specific skills, developed and certified in-house, are significant reasons 
for the ILM approach at FinCO for its managerial and specialist positions. 
As a traditionally labour-intensive service industry, where operations are simple, most 
tasks are clearly and tightly defined, and employees come from the unskilled end of the 
labour market, HotelCO can be regarded a most unlikely company in which to find an 
ILM. However, USHotel, a successful member of the few international luxury hotel 
chains, imposes pressure on HotelCO to deliver standardized top quality service to an 
exclusive international clientele. To comply with its parent’s pressures for operational 
perfectionism, HotelCO needs a more-skilled, easily trainable workforce than in the 
hotel industry in general.
While providing evidence for ILM orientation in their companies, respondents did not 
hesitate to reveal such instances as dismissals and redundancies. For example, at TexCO, 
the HR Manager said that they carried out a strategic HR planning in Turkey as a part 
of the pan-European re-structuring process, and they ‘moved out’ those people who were 
in the same position for 10–15 years, resulting in 23 percent of the positions being 
replaced with ‘new blood’. This did not mean a change in their ILM approach, however: 
they now have more elaborate and strictly controlled performance management systems 
in order to evaluate their employees and take early action when necessary. Similarly, when 
AutoCO1 was moving its production to its new facility, they could not take all their employ-
ees, as it required relocation. However, they kept all those who agreed to relocate, even 
though that meant ‘carrying a few hundred workers more than we should’ (CFO, AutoCO1). 
Both the CFO and HR/IR Director admitted that they had to do it in order not to lose the 
accumulated knowledge and experience in these workers throughout the years they had 
been employed at AutoCO1. In FMCG2, TexCO, HotelCO, and FinCO, interviewees 
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admitted that they can sometimes ‘lose people’ as the organizations did not grow enough 
to accommodate a sufficient number of promotions. Therefore, they use other methods 
(training and development opportunities, job rotations, short/long overseas assignments, 
etc.) as ‘the main objective is to keep our employees inside’ (HR manager, FMCG2).
All but TexCO and HotelCO are highly dependent on their US parents for high tech-
nology and complex operating systems. For TexCO and HotelCO, the dependence on the 
US parent is more in terms of globally recognized brand name and expertise than opera-
tional systems. Moreover, all case companies evidently have high trust in the globally 
established brand names and expertise of their American parents. Particularly the WOS, 
and JVs where HRM belongs to the US parent (i.e. FMCG2 and TexCO), Turkish man-
agers identify their companies highly with their American parents. 
Discussion and conclusion
This article sets out to address the gaps identified in the literature, namely to understand 
how macro- and micro-institutional pressures influence policy transfer when it is 
intended from an advanced economy to a less-advanced one. The choice of home- and 
host-country is made to consider ‘dominance effects’ on the process. Local JV partners 
are incorporated into the framework as actors who have potential micro-institutional 
influences and might also act as ‘transmission belts’ for macro-influences. Within this 
research context, the findings deviate from the widespread results in the extant literature. 
The corporate ILM policies are transferred without problems, showing a uniform pattern 
of ‘compliance’, i.e. full conscious obedience (Oliver, 1991). In other words, LMO of 
corporate parents are implemented and ‘internalized’ (Kostova, 1999), despite large 
institutional distance between the home- and host-countries, which theoretically reduces 
the potential for transfer as a result of highly conflicting macro- and micro-institutional 
pressures (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Given that the literature generally asserts a variety 
of non-‘acquiescence’ responses by subsidiaries to corporate policy transfers even 
between countries of smaller institutional distance (e.g. Ferner et al., 2005a; Tempel et 
al., 2006), the unproblematic transfer to, and adoption of, policy in the host-country 
stands out. This finding can be explained by the combined nature of the institutional 
‘pressures’ that work in different ways than those in the advanced economies, the role of 
local JV partners, and the specific policy transferred.
Despite the large institutional distance between the home- and host-country and dif-
ferent origins of the policy studied in them, there are no regulatory, cognitive, or norma-
tive obstacles in the host-country for the adoption of the policy. In fact, there is active 
‘institutional encouragement’ as macro-institutional ‘pressures’ are reinforced by micro-
institutional ones. At the macro-level, first, as a result of the education and skills devel-
opment system, qualified and educated employees still belong to a small ‘elite’ group. If 
companies ought to secure such a workforce, who needs further in-house training and 
development, then an ILM approach is a viable option. The host environment further 
supports the application of the policy by considerably cheaper labour costs. 
A second macro-institutional ‘encouragement’ is found at the normative level as ILMs 
and related practices are broadly diffused in the organizational field of the large corpo-
rate sector, particularly the Holdings, among which are the Turkish partners in two of the 
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JV cases. Therefore, the role of local JV partners, conceptualized in the theoretical 
framework as an alternative source of isomorphism pressures, turns out to be one of 
‘encouraging pressures’ as ILMs are transferred to the JV cases from their Turkish cor-
porate parents. The role of the local JV partners gets even more complicated considering 
they have been among the early and ‘vanguard’ adopters of US-style HRM, mostly learn-
ing from their JV partners, and emulating home-country (particularly the US) practices 
(Erçek, 2006). This study provides a recognition of JV partners as a ‘conduit for diffuse’ 
home-country influences, particularly when the home-country has dominance effects on 
the host-country where its ideas and systems are regarded as a major source of learning 
and assistance. As such, the local JV partners transfer ‘internalized’ US-style HRM 
within the TBS to their JV (and other) affiliates, acting as ‘transmission belts’ that pass 
on macro-institutional ‘pressures’, one which seems from the outset more like micro-
level pressures for the application of the specific policy.
The article provides evidence for ‘active encouragement’ also at the micro-institutional 
level. While high dependence on the MNEs for complex operating systems might act as 
an isomorphic pressure for adopting the policy, a more plausible explanation is the fit 
between the technological, operational, and efficiency needs of the companies and ILMs. 
As ILMs are expected to be pursued in technologically-advanced companies that depend 
on firm-specific skills (Dobbin et al., 1993), the case companies need to establish long-
term employment relations and retain the workers trained for complex skills to avoid the 
high cost of finding and training new workers. Subsidiaries’ positive response to micro-
institutional pressures is unsurprising as they see economic ‘fitness’, i.e. anticipated eco-
nomic gain, in adopting the policy. As such, transfer of the policy to, and adoption by, the 
subsidiaries is not unexpected, considering the macro- and micro-level ‘encouraging 
pressures’.
This study demonstrates that a policy can be transferred smoothly when the macro- 
and micro-institutional pressures for isomorphism are in the same direction and do not 
conflict with each other. Such an ideal combination of consistent pressures, providing 
‘active encouragement’ rather than conflicting pressures, might be less commonly found. 
However, the article demonstrates that it is possible under the conditions explored, princi-
pally when the host-country is a less-advanced economy with a tradition of actively 
importing knowledge and systems from the advanced ‘dominant’ home-country. Therefore 
the findings provide evidence to broaden the range of countries in which to investigate 
policy transfer especially to less-advanced economies so as to validate existing models.
The significant role of the nature of the transferred policy in the ideal combination for 
smooth transfer should also be noted. Some policies might provoke resistance and 
hybridization if they directly confront main interests of key interest groups in the sub-
sidiaries (Ferner et al., 2005a). This article shows that the argument also holds the other 
way around: when the policy serves the interests of all involved, then it can be trans-
ferred without ‘resistive hybridization’. ILM orientation is such a policy that will not be 
objected to by employees, unions, or the government, so its application does not cause a 
‘dilemma of contradictory demands’. The unproblematic transfer is therefore supported 
by the nature of the policy in question. Accordingly, the role of the specific policy in the 
process as a significant factor needs to be taken into account when investigating transfer 
issues.
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The uncommon finding about straightforward policy transfer and adoption raises the 
question of ‘decoupling’, i.e. adopting a policy for legitimacy as a strategic response but 
not implementing it in practice (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Decoupling can happen for a 
number of reasons: perceived conflict with technical efficiency, coercive pressures for 
implementation by legal bodies, pressures to mimic other firms in the sector to gain 
external legitimacy, or multiple and contradictory pressures on the organization 
(Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008). As discussed above, none of these potential reasons 
exist in the context of this study. Although evidence from below (i.e. employees) was not 
collected, sufficient verification from various actors involved (including unions) indi-
cates that ILMs are indeed transferred to and applied in the case companies.
Additionally, this is a challenging policy to decouple just for the purposes of impres-
sion management. It is not too difficult to find evidence for the (non-) application of an 
ILM orientation; for example, the number of dismissals, redundancies, new hires, aver-
age length of service in the company. Moreover, the interviewees did not hesitate to 
provide even negative information on these. While this study, based on in-depth data, 
argues that the cases do not employ decoupling strategies for the transfer of ILMs, infor-
mation collected from employees to get the full picture on the application of any policy 
will validate the actual implementation. 
The findings from this study have implications for both the academic and the practi-
tioner audience. As commonly argued in the extant literature, it is necessary to look 
beyond NBS framework to better understand policy transfer in MNEs. Micro-institutional 
pressures and the role of neglected actors (e.g. local JV partners) ought to be incorpo-
rated into the research frameworks. Echoing previous calls in the literature, more research 
in less-advanced economies is certainly needed to understand the role of not only differ-
ent NBS but also the direction of transfer from advanced countries to less-advanced 
ones. Additionally, comparative cases from different home-countries operating in the 
same (particularly less-advanced) host environment might help differentiate more clearly 
between institutional and contextual influences. Finally, more heterogeneous sets of 
cases (e.g. from among MNEs operating in sectors where education and skills require-
ments are lower) need to be investigated as these might provide meaningfully different 
results. For the practitioner community, it is important to understand under which condi-
tions policies can be transferred smoothly and what HR management can do towards this 
end. Subsidiary and corporate managers can collaborate to reduce ‘conflicting pressures’ 
and create ‘active encouragement’ for all actors involved to serve mutual benefits. In this 
way, less problematic policy transfer can be possible.
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2. Although it is beyond the focus of this article, it must be noted that there has recently been some 
research suggesting major labour shortages in the USA aggravated by demographic changes, 
which had been a principal reason for an intensified interest in talent management. It might be 
possible that the need for talent management in companies can lead to a renewed interest in ILMs.
3. Law number 4857, valid since 22/05/2003, accessible at the official website of Ministry of 
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6. No published data for sectoral distribution according to host countries was available. These 
statistics were obtained from the Foreign Capital Directorate in an interview.
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